Introduction
A crucially important policy change, which directly affects local authorities and the provision of social services, was contained in a Department of Health (DoH) The original underlying rationale for including social services complaints in the NHS reform plans was the desirability of making complaints which cross service boundaries between health and social services easier to handle. Thus the initial reason for amending the social services procedure had nothing to do with either the running or success of that procedure. It might therefore be assumed that, as the new NHS reforms do not, in fact, make detailed provision for such complaints, the plans surrounding social services would be abandoned. However, this has not proved to be the case.
Early objections to the proposal
Back in 2001 there was no consultation with local authorities before the changes were proposed in the NHS document. On the proposals being published, objectors, who included complaints officers, Independent Persons and elected members, could not see any clear advantage to the changes. It appeared that the local authority process had been swept up in NHS reforms without sufficient thought being given to the consequences. On the issue of cross-border complaints, the reason for including social services in the first place, objectors argued that better ways of dealing with these could be achieved by other means, including regulations setting a framework for information-sharing and joint investigations.
Local authority social services complaints procedures had also been the subject of consultation by the DoH and Listening to People -A Consultation on Improving Social Services Complaints Procedures came to a conclusion in June 2000. However, this document did not contain either a basis for, or a recommendation for, the change now proposed. Objectors therefore argued that there was no evidence, or other firm basis, in the DoH publications or elsewhere that the change would improve local authority handling of complaints. There was certainly no research basis for the change, although the DoH was aware of some very detailed research on the social services Panel process that was then being undertaken (see Ph.D by Katy Ferris, forthcoming) and it was suggested by the objectors that, if changes were to be made, then proper research should inform such changes. It can be seen that the Act does not simply transfer the functions of the Panel stage to the CSCI and therefore there is no necessity to do so, but subsequent consultation has proceeded on the basis that all review Panels will henceforth be run by the CSCI.
Variations in practice
One of the stated aims of the newly formed CSCI is to improve complaints handling.
There is detailed research evidence (Ferris, forthcoming) that there are considerable variations in practice between different local authorities in the way that complaints are handled and in the way that Panels operate. It is also a commonsense observation, since the Regulations (the Representations Procedure (Children) Regulations 1991, SI No. 894) and Guidance (the Children Act Guidance, Volume 3 Family Placements, chapter 10 and Volume 4 Residential Care, chapter 5) surrounding the complaints procedure are very lacking in detail. Some local authorities have struggled to know how best to operate the procedure in view of the lack of clear direction and it is evident that some sort of national standards, with which all local authorities should comply, are required.
Complaints are a vital function and should be taken very seriously. Not only do complainants themselves potentially benefit from bringing a complaint, but so too do other service users. One of the rationales for a complaints procedure is that it should be used to inform policies, practices and procedures. Recommendations from investigations into complaints and from Panel hearings, when of general application, should give rise to a better service. Therefore, if the system is not functioning as well as it should then reform is called for. However, it is argued here that the solution being proposed, transferring Panels to the CSCI, is not the appropriate response to the problem.
Concerns about the basis for change
The rationale for change
The proposed changes to the system contained in the three consultation documents do not explain why the system should alter. There is no longer any attempted justification that it is to make cross-boundary complaints easier to handle. However, both the DoH and the CSCI documents outline what is now said to be the basic underpinning to the changes.
The DoH consultation paper makes an absolutely fundamental statement in paragraph When this statement is analysed it can be found that it simply does not represent the true situation.
(a) Listening to People
Nowhere in the document Listening to People are there any critical statements about the quality of Panels. In fact, very little is said about Panels at all. The mere fact that they exist is referred to in paragraphs 3.2, 3.5, 6.9 (where it is a suggested requirement that the Chair should always be an independent person, which in practice is the case) and 7.7. Section 10 is the only part of the document that contains more than a passing reference to Panels. Paragraph 10.1 does express concern about the implementation of Panel decisions and is followed with comments about how better to monitor implementation in paragraphs 10.2 and 10.3, but these paragraphs are not critical of the Panels themselves. Then, in paragraph 10.4, practically the reverse of the alleged concern is written, as the document states:
the Ombudsman noted that Review Panels are not always made the best use of. From their knowledge of a case they may be best placed to propose suitable remedies.
Thus it can be seen that the alleged negative comments about Panels simply do not exist in Listening to People. Reports from 1991 to the present day. It cannot seriously be argued that these very minor criticisms justify a radical overhaul of an entire system.
(c) Case law
The comment about the lack of independence of Panel members is not explained in either the DoH or CSCI documents, but the overwhelming likelihood is that this comment is directed at the use of local authority elected members on Panels. It is undoubtedly the case that elected members are widely used as the other two members on Panels. In her research, Ferris found this to be the practice in a large majority of local authorities. Of the 47 authorities she surveyed, 23 authorities had an independent Chair plus two elected members and a further 15 authorities used elected members as one of the two wing members. The argument surrounding elected members is that not only are they are not independent people but they also have a vested interest in the outcome of Panels. Ultimately, these members take decisions about the budget of their local authority. Therefore, it is argued, they have an interest in preserving funds and will take decisions according to their own financial priorities. The comment by the Court of Appeal that, without evidence, there was no reason to suppose even a subconscious bias is of central importance. It is this that makes it acceptable to use elected members without fear of being immediately challenged either for breach of Article 6 or for breach of the rules of natural justice.
The second and even more important comment by the Court of Appeal concerned the use of 'non-independent' people on complaints Panels. The Court recognised that elected members have to take decisions which involve competing interests and thus competing access to funding. On this the Court said:
In our judgment the scheme here is exactly of the kind where the first decisions are properly confided (sic) within the public body having responsibility for the scheme's administration. Difficult issues of judgment will arise; and difficult balances will have to be struck. We acknowledge that in this particular case issues of credibility arose for decision, and were important to the decision. It is plain however that that circumstance will not of itself require, as the price of compliance with the Art 6 standard, the addition of a strictly independent adjudicative process empowered to re-decide the The importance of this case is that it exposes more clearly than any earlier case has done, the interrelation between the Article 6(1) concept of civil rights on the one hand and the Article 6(1) requirement of 'an independent and impartial tribunal' on the other." (At [5])
The House of Lords were clear that, whilst there was no reason to doubt the impartiality of the reviewing officer, 'I do not see how she can sensibly be said to be independent … She was an officer of the very Council which was alleged to owe the duty … The want of independence is manifest. ' (Lord Millett at [96] ). However, assuming, without deciding, that Runa Begum's 'civil right' was engaged, and therefore that Article 6 was applicable, such a decision might properly be made by a tribunal which did not itself possess the necessary independence to satisfy the requirements of Article 6(1). This was acceptable provided measures were in place to safeguard the fairness of the proceedings and the decision was subject to ultimate judicial control by a court with jurisdiction to deal with the case as its nature required.
As a result of these two decisions, it can be seen that the courts have established that it is fully within the remit of local authorities to set up Panels with varied membership, including elected members, and that this is a perfectly sensible, and indeed correct, way for them to proceed. The approach of the courts can also be backed up by Ferris's research. She found that a very strong message being reported back to Complaints Officers was that complainants really wanted to have an elected member on the Panel. They wanted members to hear what had gone on, as they identified them as someone who could learn from the experience and 'do something.'
Concerns about the proposed scheme
In January 2005 CSCI published feedback on its consultation document (see It is obviously the case that the LGO are the ones who have the most experience and expertise in dealing with social services complaints and that the LGO are more local to the complainant than the PCA. It would seem sensible to confine all issues relating to complaints to those with this expertise, but there is a further serious drawback for the complainant under the proposed scheme. Throughout the consultation, there is an emphasis on timescales and on the need to resolve matters relatively quickly.
However, introducing different bodies into the process will inevitably increase the time taken for resolution or exhaustion of the complaints procedure, to the detriment of the complainant.
Another change which will impact adversely on complainants is the suggestion that CSCI will have the option of informing them no further action will be taken.
Currently, all complainants can, if they wish, take their complaint to Panel. However, more importantly from the point of view of independence, in either of the two examples given, the CSCI will be prejudging the case and not having the benefit of a balanced Panel of three. Furthermore, there is the potential that by virtue of commissioning an investigation the CSCI will inevitably be compromising its own independence and raising a conflict of interest. The way in which this could arise would be if there are unresolved issues stemming from its investigation. In these circumstances, the CSCI will be reviewing its own decisions; those it has made itself in relation to the investigation and its findings.
On top of the above, the CSCI propose that when running a The first thing that can be noted about the process described above is that, once again, an element of delay is introduced into the procedure, contrary to the CSCIs own emphasis on timescales. More significantly, the net result of all this is that the CSCI can be seen as having the role of enforcer, registrar, investigator and reviewer of its own actions and decisions. All of these different roles are simply not compatible. The proposals for Panels are completely unwarranted. Currently, Panels are not interfered with in this way. They are responsible for sending their findings and recommendations to the Director of Social Services without checking by any third party. There is no justification given as to why they should be subject to this scrutiny by members of the CSCI complaints team. The proposal is that membership of Panels will be the result of the recruitment of suitable people by the CRS. If they are suitable, surely they, having been present at Panel and having heard all of the evidence and arguments, should be left to make and sign off their own decisions?
(c) Risk of increased litigation
Following sign-off, the proposal is that the CRS will issue the Panel's recommendations to both the complainant and the local authority. The authority will then make its decision. Thereafter, any subsequent monitoring and implementation of any recommendations will be undertaken by the CRS. Thus, unlike at present, there is no possibility of dialogue between the Panel Chair and the decision-maker. The Chair also loses any control over implementation of panel recommendations. This gives rise to the potential for increased litigation and, thus, expense. Currently, the Chair can talk through any recommendations about which the Director of Social Services is doubtful. Wording can be amended, in the light of these discussions, to ensure that what is perhaps designed as a response to an individual complaint does not tie the authority's hands in an unintended or unacceptable way. However, if the opportunity to discuss the ramifications of a recommendation is lost this could lead to Directors refusing to accept recommendations. This is likely to lead to reference to at least the
LGO and may well lead to litigation in the courts by an aggrieved complainant.
That a recommendation might be too widely worded is not a demonstration of poor quality on the part of Panels. Any person not intimately involved in the actual running of a procedure may inadvertently make a recommendation without appreciating the full extent of the ramifications of that recommendation. Again, it is very unusual for the authority to send any sort of legal representative to the actual hearing. Overall, it is in a minority of cases that lawyers are present at a Panel hearing. However, on occasion it is necessary and extremely helpful to have a lawyer present.
Access to legal assistance at Panel will change under the proposed procedure. Instead of the Panel being able to ask for an advisor to attend, the CRS 'will take appropriate legal advice in advance on any contentious issues upon which the Panel may need to be advised and informed ' (at [121] ). However, there is no intention that the CSCI will provide a legal representative on the day. Complainants who reasonably wish to bring a legal representative will continue to be able to do so. No mention is made in the document of the position of the local authority.
The declared position of the CSCI of having 'no intention to provide a legal representative' seems unnecessary and to have the potential to give rise to problems.
Whilst with most complaints it may appear to be clear what, if any, legal issues are liable to arise, Panel hearings should be organised on the basis that if it is clear in advance there is a contentious legal matter then advice may be necessary on the day. This is especially so in view of the recognition in the CSCI document that a complainant might want to bring a legal advisor to Panel and that this could put the Panel in the position that they are faced with a legal argument that they are simply unable to cope with or respond to. It is very important for Panels to be in a position to ask the right questions and to be given an accurate interpretation of the law.
(e) Funding
It is a trite observation that most local authority social services departments are very short of funding. Social services are a 'Cinderella' service, rarely attracting sympathetic coverage in the media. In contrast to health and education, governments do not announce with delight their intention of increasing spending on social services.
In light of this, the question of the financing of the new system is of crucial importance. The implication of what is proposed is that the system will cost a substantial amount more than is currently the case, yet no reference is made in any of the documents to any extra funding being provided to local authorities.
Under the new proposals, there will be no reduction in the work of Complaints
Officers that could lead to savings. Indeed, there is likely to be an increase in such work. Complaints Officers will still be required to attend Panel hearings and, on top of this, with the implementation of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 more areas of complaint are now to be covered by the complaints procedure. No longer will it be confined to complaints under Part III of the Children Act; certain sections in Parts IV and V will also be brought within the remit of the procedure. Additionally, adoption complaints, which were previously not covered, now will be. Complaints Officers will also be responsible for assisting children in finding advocates when they make a complaint.
Elected members will no longer be used on Panels, but local authority funds will be top-sliced in some way to pay for Panels. This will be an extra expense for the authority, which currently does not have to pay for councillor Panel members. It is also curious that elected members are being ditched from the process. In the CSCI proposals, when outlining membership of Panels it is stated that the 'wing' independent persons on the Panel will provide 'a regional and/or local knowledge base'. Surely this is exactly what elected members currently provide.
With the proposals for the CSCI to undertake a review in certain cases, there is an obvious potential for duplication of the work of the Complaints Unit. There is also a confusion between the roles of the CSCI and that of the LGO, who may undertake an investigation if a complaint is successfully referred to them. All of this will inevitably impact on the local authority, which will end up bearing the cost of these extra investigations.
(f) Confidentiality
A major issue for some complainants is that of confidentiality. Currently, many complainants are anxious that their complaints should not be seen by anybody other than those who are strictly necessary to the procedure. There is, of course, a duty of confidentiality on all complaints staff, investigators and Panel members. With the introduction of the CSCI, many more people than is currently the case will now have access to the complaint. This will result not just in more people knowing about an individual's complaint, but also gives rise to attendant fears of breaches of confidentiality and introduces what could be argued as an embedded breach of a person's confidentiality. Currently, within both social services and complaints units, information is only shared on a 'need to know' basis. However, the proposed scheme includes a case manager, team leader and head of complaints at the CSCI who will all have access to a person's complaint. There should, surely, be some strong justification for expanding the need to know principle in this way, yet none is given in the document. It is simply stated that this is what will happen.
Conclusion
Even at this late stage, there is no necessity to transfer Panels to the CSCI. Section It would be perfectly easy to introduce new regulations about the composition and running of Panels without taking drastic steps. Perhaps the most obvious suggestion would be to make it a requirement that membership of the Panels should consist of at least two independent people, with only one elected local authority member as a wing member. This would go a very long way towards satisfying the reasons given for introducing change. It would also ensure that vital local knowledge of what is happening at Panels is maintained. Moreover, it would be considerably cheaper and
